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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for aggravated sexual abuse of a child, a first 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1(3) (1999). This Court has 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Were the prosecutor's remarks during his opening statement and rebuttal argument 
improper? 
Standard of Review. Where defendant did not object to the prosecutor's statements 
during trial, this Court reviews his claim for plain error. State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, ^ f 56, 
979 P.2d 799. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
No constitutional provision, statute, or rule is central to this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant was charged with aggravated sexual abuse of a child, a first degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1(3) (1999). R. 1-4. Defendant was thereafter 
extradited from Kansas to California to answer the charges. R. 5-6. A preliminary hearing 
was held and defendant was bound over for trial. R. 66:18-20. Following a one-day trial, a 
jury found defendant guilty as charged. R. 42; R. 66: 150. The court sentenced defendant to 
a prison term of five years-to-life and ordered him to pay restitution to the victim. R. 48-51. 
Defendant timely appealed and the Utah Supreme Court transferred the appeal to this Court 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (2002). R. 52-54, 65. 
SUMMARY OF FACTS 
In January 2002, Barbara Butterfield became suspicious that her five-year-old 
daughter Amber was being abused because she had been getting yeast infections, unusual for 
a girl her age. R. 66: 54-56, 63, 75. To protect her, Ms. Butterfield kept her away from 
some in the neighborhood she suspected might be the perpetrators. R. 66: 75. Soon after, 
Amber came to her mother, put her hand down her pants in her vaginal area, and said, 
"Daddy's been touching me here." R. 66: 56-58. Amber told her mother that defendant 
usually touched her when she was in the bathtub while the mother was at work. R. 66: 58-
59. Amber told her mother that defendant also touched her on the "bottom end." R. 66: 59. 
In a recorded interview on January 8,2002, Amber told Officer Edward Guerrero that 
defendant had touched her vagina and bottom while she was taking a bath. R. 66: 60-61,69, 
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107-08, 115. In a second interview on February 15,2002, Amber indicated that defendant 
had also put some "long sticks" with feathers on the ends in her vagina and rectum. R. 66: 
61-63, 72, 116. Her mother concluded that the sticks were arrows defendant had in the 
home. R, 66: 62. During this second interview, Amber appeared distracted and gave some 
conflicting answers, but ultimately confirmed t^he abuse. R. 66: 111, 116-19,122, 127. 
At trial, Amber testified that defendant put his hand down her shirt, underneath her 
panties, and touched her vagina. R. 66: 90-91. She testified that on multiple occasions, 
defendant came into the bathroom while she was bathing, directed her to stand up, and 
"played" with her vagina and bottom. R. 66: 91-93. She testified that on more than one 
occasion, he inserted an arrow in her vagina and bottom. R. 66: 93-95. She also testified 
that defendant told her not to tell anyone because "we'll get in trouble." R. 66: 97. Amber 
denied that anyone else had ever touched her inappropriately. R. 66: 95-96, 103-04. 
In March 2003, the State took custody of Amber where she remained until trial. R. 
66: 64. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Because defendant did not object to the prosecutor's remarks, he must show plain 
error. He has failed to meet that burden. The prosecutor's remarks were not improper—they 
did not call to the jurors' attention matters the jury could not consider. The prosecutor's 
rebuttal comments were appropriate responses to arguments made by defense counsel in his 
closing argument and did not suggest personal knowledge by the prosecutor or that his 
opinion should be credited by virtue of his position. The prosecutor's comment in his 
opening statement is fairly construed as a prediction that the jury would find the evidence 
convincing. To the extent any of the comments were improper, they were not obviously 
improper. Moreover, given the instructions to the jury that statements of the lawyers are not 
evidence and the insignificance of any error, it cannot be said that the comments were 
substantially prejudicial. Defendant's claim thus fails. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE PROSECUTOR'S REMARKS DURING HIS OPENING 
STATEMENT AND REBUTTAL ARGUMENT WERE NOT 
IMPROPER 
Defendant contends that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during his opening 
statement and closing argument by expressing his personal opinion and asserting facts not in 
evidence. Aplt. Brf. at 6-15. Because defendant did not object to the prosecutor's remarks 
during trial, he must demonstrate plain error, meaning that the remarks were not only 
improper, but "obvious[ly]" improper and "substantially prejudicial." State v. Bakalov, 1999 
UT 45,1f 56, 979 P.2d 799. Defendant has failed to meet that burden. 
A prosecutor's remarks will be considered improper if the remarks 'called to the 
jurors' attention matters which they would not be justified in considering in reaching a 
verdict'" State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, \ 61, 55 P.3d 573 (quoting State v. Emmett, 839 
P.2d 781, 785 (Utah 1992)). For example, a prosecutor may not refer to facts not in 
evidence. See State v. Andreason, 718 P.2d 400, 402 (Utah 1986). A prosecutor likewise 
engages in misconduct "when he or she asserts personal knowledge of the facts in issue or 
expresses personal opinion, being 'a form of unsworn, unchecked testimony [which] tends to 
exploit the influence of the prosecutor's office and undermine the objective detachment that 
should separate a lawyer from the cause being argued.'" State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 
1284 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1255-56 (Utah 1988)). 
On the other hand, the Utah Supreme Court has "repeatedly observed 'that counsel for 
each side has considerable latitude [in closing arguments] and may discuss fully his or her 
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viewpoint of the evidence and the deductions arising therefrom.'5' Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, \ 
56 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1223 (Utah 1993)) (brackets in original). 
Moreover, the prosecutor is free to "make assertions about what the jury may reasonably 
conclude from those deductions." Id. at \ 57. In sum, the prosecutor may argue "what the 
evidence is or is not, and what it does or does not show." State v. Kazda, 540 P.2d 949,951 
(Utah 1975). A prosecutor may thus comment on the strength of the evidence, including the 
"overall shortfall of defense evidence." See State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, % 33,94 
P.3d 186; see also People v. Bahoda, 531 N.W.2d 659, 672 (Mich. 1995) (holding that 
prosecutor may "comment[ ] on the effect and strength of [the] evidence"); People v. 
Emerson, 522 N.E.2d 1109,1118(111.1988) (holding that "[c]omments on the strength of the 
evidence are permitted"); but see State v. Hopkins, 782 P.2d 475, 479 (Utah 1989) 
(concluding that prosecutor's argument that he was impressed by evidence and "could not 
convey in words in any capacity why the State is so impressed" was improper). 
In determining whether the remarks of a prosecutor were improper, the Court must 
view those remarks "in light of the totality of the evidence presented at trial." State v. 
Cummins, 839 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah App. 1992). An examination of the remarks complained 
of here, in light of the factual context in which they were made, reveals that the prosecutor's 
remarks were proper. 
The "closing" remarks challenged by defendant on appeal were not made during the 
prosecutor's closing argument, but rather during his rebuttal to defense counsel's closing 
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argument SeeR. 66: 144-49. Therefore, a proper examination of the prosecutor's rebuttal 
remarks requires, in each instance, a review of the arguments of defense counsel. 
The Mother's Competency as a Mother 
In his closing argument, defense counsel pointed out that Ms. Butterfield no longer 
had custody of Amber and that her house "was unorganized." R. 66: 139-40. He further 
argued that Ms. Butterfield provided "improper supervision" of her daughter, raising, he 
claimed, "a lot of questions about who else was involved in this community where some of 
these terrible things took place." R. 66:140. In response to the defense's disparagement of 
Amber's mother, the prosecutor countered as follows: 
Ladies and gentlemen, this isn't whether Barbara Butterfield keeps a messy 
house or not or if she's organized. Ah, it wasn't about her competence as a 
mother. Ah, Barbara Butterfield testified, in my opinion—and I guess 
everybody has a different opinion about what somebody says, but a mother 
who keeps track of a child knows when they're at the neighbor's house, knows 
who they're playing with, checks on 'em every half hour or so is, to me, being 
fairly responsible. I don't think that Barbara Butterfield could have done 
anything, could have recognized before the fact that her husband was going to 
abuse her daughter and could have saved her from that. It isn't about Barbara 
Butterfield or her supervision. 
R. 66: 145. 
Defendant claims that the prosecutor's comments "in my opinion" and "I don't think" 
were improper "expressions of personal knowledge and opinion" that defendant abused 
Amber. Aplt. Brf. at 8. The prosecutor, however, did not suggest that he had personal 
knowledge of the abuse. Nor can his "opinion" of Ms. Butterfield's supervision be construed 
as '"a form of unsworn, unchecked testimony [which] tend[s] to exploit the influence of the 
prosecutor's office '" Parsons, 781 P.2d at 1284 (quoting Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1255-
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56). Indeed, the prosecutor quickly observed that "everybody has a different opinion about 
what somebody says." R. 66:145. The prosecutor here "was merely drawing a permissible 
deduction from the evidence," arguing that knowing Amber's whereabouts, knowing with 
whom she was playing, and checking on her every half hour was, contrary to defense 
counsel's argument, "fairly responsible." R. 66: 145. 
The Mother's Testimony 
During his closing argument, defense counsel also argued that Ms. Butterfield's 
"memory appeared quite selective when [she was asked] questions about the interviews that 
took place where she was present." R. 66: 140. In response, the prosecutor argued: 
Ah, counsel tried to get Ms. Butterfield to admit things. He said, "Now 
didn't—isn't this what she—isn't this what Amber said in this? Isn't this what 
she said?" That's not what I remember. Maybe she—at this point she's 
dealing on impressions and her impression of that interview was what she told 
you and what Eddie Guerrero told you and what she—Amber testified to. 
Counsel tried to get her to say, "Oh, she—she backed off of this. She 
backed off of that," but she didn't say that. Check your notes. Check your 
memory. That didn't happen. 
R. 66:145. 
On appeal, defendant claims that the comment, "That's not what I remember," 
constituted the prosecutor's personal opinion about the testimony and "create[d] a false 
impression as to Mrs. Barbara Butterfield's testimony." Aplt. Brf. at 9. In context, however, 
the prosecutor's comment, "That's not what I remember," is clearly a paraphrase of Ms. 
Butterfield's answers to defense counsel's cross-examination about the interviews. For 
example, after defense counsel reminded Ms. Butterfield that she was under oath, he asked 
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her, "Isn't it true that Amber had said no, that her father had not touched her, in that 
interview?" R. 66: 69. Ms. Butterfield responded, "I don't remember her saying no, that he 
had not touch [sic] her. No." After defense counsel pressed her, she again testified, "I don't 
think she said no." Ms. Butterfield likewise responded to several other questions about the 
interviews. See, e.g., R. 66: 72 (twice responding, "I don't remember that"); R. 66: 74 
(responding "I don't remember that"). Moreover, the prosecutor did not ask the jury to rely 
on his memory, but admonished them to check their notes and their own memory. R. 66: 
145. 
Medical Evidence 
Defense counsel also argued in closing that had Amber been abused, "you would 
think that there would be some medical evidence that there would be clear and convincing 
evidence that something had happened." R. 66: 143. He further argued that had the arrows 
penetrated Amber, "there would be some information to clearly state that yeah, something 
had happened." R. 66: 143. He then observed, "We don't have that." R. 66: 143. In sum, 
without introducing any supporting evidence, defense counsel argued that medical evidence 
would have necessarily existed had there in fact been abuse. 
The prosecutor responded as follows: 
Medical evidence.... Maybe you're wondering why there's no medical 
evidence. But—but if there are medical reports in that file that talk about this 
thing, it's just as easy for the defense to subpoena those witnesses as it is for 
the prosecution. If I don't feel that kind of evidence is gonna help you in your 
decision, then I don't subpoena that witness. 
Now why would medical evidence possibly not help in a decision. If we 
have a Medical Examiner take a look at a little girl and they say, "We've 
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examined this girl and we can't either affirm or preclude what her statements 
are. We can't say yes or no/5 then that doesn't really help you, does it? Get 
somebody down here from Salt Lake City to tell you, "We can't say yes or 
no," means you know what? 
Let me make another point. If I get a rape victim that was raped yesterday 
and we have her examined, then what we have is things like cuts, bruises, 
swelling, so forth. If this person was abused two weeks ago and they 
examined her, then maybe they say, "You know what? The opening's 
consistent with having been penetrated, but we can't—there's not bruising. 
We can't say that he did it. We can't say that it was done by an arrow. 
So why do they want you to think about medical evidence, ladies and 
gentlemen? And if we're gonna raise a reasonable doubt about that, ladies and 
gentlemen, it's supposed to be something more than fancy imagination or 
wholly speculative possibility. You don't have any medical evidence supports 
the fact that this girl wasn't abused. You're gonna have to make your decision 
based upon her saying what happened to her and how she acted after that 
occurred and whether it's consistent with what she said and whether you 
believe her and whether you believe that maybe she had some ulterior motive 
for making those kinds of statements. 
R. 66: 146-47. 
Defendant contends on appeal that the foregoing argument "is highly problematic 
considering that there never was medical evidence introduced during trial" and that it 
"suggested] medical evidence that would confirm the defendant's guilt." Aplt. Brf. at 11. 
To the contrary, Officer Guerrero had previously testified that the arrows were not tested for 
the presence of bodily fluid and the prosecutor thus conceded that no medical evidence 
existed that would confirm the abuse. R. 66: 117. Defense counsel had just argued that 
medical evidence would have confirmed the abuse if true and suggested that the lack of such 
evidence was proof that no abuse occurred. The prosecutor was not required to let this 
argument go unchallenged. He was entitled to point out that defendant had not introduced 
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any evidence supporting his argument. As held by the Utah Supreme Court, "[a] prosecutor 
has the duty and right to argue the case based on the 'total picture shown by the evidence or 
the lack thereof/ including reference to the paucity or absence of evidence adduced by the 
defense." State v. Hales, 652 P.2d 1290, 1291 (Utah 1982) (citation omitted). 
In light of defendant's argument in closing, the prosecutor was likewise entitled to 
explain why the lack of medical evidence did not necessarily establish that no abuse 
occurred. The prosecutor's explanation was not unlike that of the prosecutor in Bakalov. In 
that case, the prosecutor argued in closing that "DNA analysis [of a sperm sample] was not 
possible given the physical condition of the sample [(a fact not in evidence)] and that had 
Bakalov wanted, he could have tested the sample for himself." Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, at ^ 
60. The Supreme Court held that the prosecutor's remarks were permissible because they 
were "prompted by Bakalov's claim in his closing argument that the State had deliberately 
refused to perform DNA testing which, Bakalov alleged, could have exonerated him." Id. 
The Court "recognize[d] that, notwithstanding Bakalov's attacks, the prosecutor ideally 
should not have argued outside of the evidence; such a foray into facts not adduced at trial 
was unnecessary to answer defendant's assertions." Id. The Court nevertheless concluded 
that "Bakalov's accusations invited the prosecutor's extra-evidentiary reply." Id. 
Under Bakalov, therefore, and to the extent that the prosecutor in this case offered an 
"extra-evidentiary reply," defense counsel invited that reply by arguing that the lack of any 
medical evidence established that no abuse had occurred. 
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Reasonable Doubt and Strength of the Evidence 
In concluding his rebuttal, the prosecutor addressed his burden to prove the case 
against defendant beyond a reasonable doubt: 
A reasonable doubt is not fancy imagination, wholly speculative possibility, 
and it's based on evidence. If you have had a doubt raised, you have to be 
able to say to yourself, "How is that—have I had some kind of doubt draw into 
this thing, based upon itself evidence that I heard? I say that you haven't, 
ladies and gentlemen. 
And my belief is that the evidence in this case from Amber [ ], from all of 
her statements, from her interviews is—is overwhelming. The elements of this 
case have been met. I ask you to convict Mr. Larsen of abusing his daughter. 
Thank you. 
R. 66: 148-49. Defendant contends that the prosecutor improperly gave his personal opinion 
regarding the lack of a reasonable doubt and the strength of the State's evidence. Aplt. Brf. 
at 12-13. The prosecutor, however, did no more than vigorously advocate his case from his 
viewpoint of the evidence. See State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 550 (Utah App. 1998) 
(holding that'" [a] prosecutor is not precluded from vigorous advocacy'"); Bakalov, 1999 UT 
45, at \ 56 (holding that counsel "'may discuss fully his or her viewpoint of the evidence"). 
As in Bakalov and Lafferty, it is "very unlikely that a juror would consider these statements 
to be factual testimony from the prosecutor." Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, at f 57 (quoting 
Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1256). 
Defendant cites State v. Hopkins, 782 P.2d 475 (Utah 1989), in support of his claim 
that a prosecutor may not comment on the strength of the evidence. Aplt. Brf. at 12-13. In 
that case, the prosecutor told the jury that he was "plainly impressed by the evidence," but 
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cautioned that his impression was "no call for [the jury] to be impressed by the evidence." 
Hopkins, 782 P.2d at 479. He further stated, however, that it was "impossible for [him] to 
convey in words in any capacity why the State [was] so impressed with the evidence in this 
case." Id. The Court concluded that the prosecutor's argument were "clearly directed 
toward a matter the jury would not be justified in considering and thus was improper." Id. 
The Court observed that the argument might "'convey the impression that evidence not 
presented to the jury, but known to the prosecutor, supports the charges against defendant'" 
and that '"the prosecutor's opinion carries with it the imprimatur of the Government and may 
induce the jury to trust the Government's judgment rather than its own view of the 
evidence.'" Id. at 479-80 (citation omitted).1 
The concerns in Hopkins are not present here. Like the prosecutor in Hopkins, the 
prosecutor here argued that the evidence was strong. But unlike the prosecutor in Hopkins, 
the prosecutor here did not indicate that he was unable to explain why he believed the 
evidence was strong. At best, the statement in Hopkins invoked the "'imprimatur of the 
Government,'" suggesting to the jury that it should simply "'trust the Government's 
judgment rather than its own view of the evidence.'" Id. at 480 (citation omitted). At worst, 
it suggested that '"evidence not presented to the jury, but known to the prosecutor, 
Three paragraphs later, however, the Supreme Court appears to reject the 
defendant's claim that "the prosecutor's comments conveyed the impression to the jury that 
there was other evidence known to the prosecution but not presented to the jury that would 
support the charge against defendant and that the jury was induced to trust the prosecutor's 
(and the state's) judgment rather than its own." Hopkins, 782 P.2d at 480. 
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supported] the charges against the defendant.'" Id. (citation omitted). The prosecutor here 
made no such comments, but stated that the evidence was strong based on Amber's 
testimony. By so indicating, the prosecutor did no more than argue the case from his 
viewpoint. See Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, at ^ 56 (holding that prosecutor "'may discuss fully 
his or her viewpoint of the evidence'"); see also Bahoda, 531 N.W.2d at 672 (holding that 
prosecutor may "comment[ ] on the effect and strength of [the] evidence"); Emerson, 522 
N.E.2d at 1118 (holding that "[c]omments on the strength of the evidence are permitted"). 
Finally, the prosecutor's claim that the evidence for conviction was strong did no 
more than counter defense counsel's closing argument that there was "a significant amount 
of doubt" in the case and that "the evidence [was] not sufficient." R. 66: 144. That the 
defense viewed the evidence as weak and that the prosecution viewed it as strong surely 
came as no surprise to the jury. 
Opening Statement 
After the prosecutor provided the jury with a "thumbnail sketch" of the evidence he 
intended to introduce, he concluded his opening statement as follows: 
I think our evidence is strong and will—and—and you will be convinced and I 
will ask you to convict. 
R. 66: 51. Defendant contends that "the prosecutor committed error when [he] called to the 
attention of the jury his personal knowledge and opinion in the form of'I think.'" Aplt. Brf. 
at 7. Citing State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221 (Utah 1980), he argues that the comments 
constituted "'a form of unsworn, unchecked testimony'" and "tendfed] to exploit the 
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influence of the prosecutor's office."5 Aplt. Brf. at 7 & fn.2 (quoting Dibello, 780 P.2d at 
1227 (citation omitted)). 
Contrary to defendant's claim, the prosecutor's comments, fairly viewed, were not a 
form of unsworn testimony or an invocation of the prosecutor's influence. Rather, the 
remarks were "mere predictions of what the jury would believe in its future deliberations 
. . . . " Parsons, 781 P.2d at 1284. 
The State acknowledges that "[i]t is generally accepted that an opening statement 
should not be argumentative." State v. Williams, 656 P.2d 450, 452 (Utah 1982). Unlike 
closing argument, "[t]he purpose of an opening statement is to apprise the jury of what 
counsel intends to prove in his own case in chief by way of providing the jury an overview 
of, and general familiarity with, the facts the party intends to prove." Id. The prosecutor's 
comment that the evidence was strong might be construed as argumentative. However, as 
noted, the comment was no more than a prediction that the jury would be persuaded by the 
evidence. As such, it was not improper. 
* * * 
In sum, none of the challenged remarks of the prosecutor were improper. At worst, 
the remarks fell within that "gray zone" referred to by the Court in Hopkins where "[t]he line 
which separates acceptable from improper advocacy is often difficult to draw." Hopkins, 
782 P.2d at 480. As such, the comments were not "obvious[ly]" improper. Bakalov, 1999 
UT 45, at \ 56. Moreover, any arguable error was not "substantially prejudicial." Id. 
Although the case turned on Amber's credibility, it cannot be said that the jury was 
15 
"'probably influenced by those remarks.'5' Calliham, 2002 UT 86, at ^ f 61 (citation omitted). 
This is particularly true where the jury was instructed that "[statements of the lawyers are 
not evidence" and that "the jurors are the final judges of the evidence." R. 36. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's conviction. 
Respectfully submitted October 6, 2004. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
IY S. GRAY 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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